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I would like the Administration to explain why it thinks, as Secretary Rumsfeld said today, that Iraq resembles Germany and Japan after World War II, and South Korea after the Korean War, not only in the likelihood of being a coherent, stable, well-run nation-state, but in being that coherent, stable, well-run nation-state, will help further the interests of the United States.

Post-war Japan no longer had an Emperor-Divinity, but the Hirohito who wore a Mickey Mouse watch and was happy to have that Divine Wind taken out of the sails of the Japanese ship of state. Post-war West Germany became a useful instrument of Western policy, and a contributor to the Western defense that, like Japan, was important during the Cold War. South Korea, after the Korean War, ditto. But Kodo was discredited; Nazism was discredited; Communism in South Korea did not need to be discredited -- one had only to look at what happened in North Korea.

In Iraq, Islam is not discredited. And it is Islam that gives rise to the Jihad, and to the succession of despots, and attitudes of the peoples over whom those despots rule, who are naturally aggressive, naturally inclined to put their oil revenues into armaments as well as into all the other instruments of Jihad, including support for mosques, madrasas, armies of apologists both Muslim and non-Muslim, Western hirelings often chosen from the ranks of former diplomats and government officials who can use their prestige and seeming disinterestedness ("Committee for the National Interest" and that sort of thing) to push a pro-Saudi or pro-Arab or anti-Israel or soft-on-Islam line, sometimes out of conviction, or a mixture of convictions (anti-Americanism and antisemitism will do nicely in Europe, antisemitism of either the left-wing or right-wing variety, does better in the United States).

Tell us again why it is better to move heaven and earth, and keep American troops in Iraq, in order to prevent civil war, or to keep it contained, rather than to allow the secartian fissures to widen, and to hope that that fissure remains, creating a permanent fault line between Sunni and Shi'a, and that there are repercussions both in Iraq, as men, money, and materiel from both Iran and Sunni Arab states flow in, and in the wider world of Islam, as Shi'a in Lebanon, or in al-Hasa province of Saudi Arabia, or in Yemen, or Pakistan, or Bahrain, inflict blows on, or have blows inflicted on them, Sunnis among whom they live.

And tell us again why it is simply out of the question for the Administration to support the notion of an independent Kurdistan, that might serve to attract Kurds in Syria and Iran, and be used (if necessary) as a tool with which to force Turkey to be better behaved toward its old American ally which it has not been treating properly -- for only the Americans can put a limit on Kurdish territorial ambitions so that they do not extend into eastern Anatolia. And that free Kurdistan would raise the issue of Islam as a vehicle of Arab supremacism, and of Arab cultural, linguistic, and economic imperialism. Berbers in North Africa (and in France) may find the Kurdish outcome inspiring, and one capable of provoking thought on the whole nature of Islam. Since 80% of the world's Muslims are non-Arab, one way of weakening the camp of Islam is to simply allow the truth about Islam, as that carrier of an Arab supremacist ideology, be discussed more openly -- particularly in Indonesia (Pakistan is probably a hopeless case, given that its inhabitants have Islam and only Islam to fall back on; Indonesia can still be saved).

Tell us again why the exploitation of these natural-occurring sectarian and ethnic fissures, so as to weaken, divide, and demoralize the camp of Islam, this makes no sense. Tell us why instead the policies of this administration, which have consistently revealed a failure to comprehend both the nature of the larger menace of Islam (of which Iraq was only a local example, and not even the most important one, Iran always being the more dangerous of the two, and now Iran is in danger of slipping by unchecked, because the American governemnt is so focussed on Iraq, and has 140,000 hostages to Iranian retaliation within reach of Iran's army and, even within Iraq, Iranian agents and Shi'a collaborators, ready to wreak vengeance on the American soldiers should any attack be launched on Iran's nuclear facilities). Tell us why you keep insisting on parrroting phrases about a "war on terror" when the world-wide Jihad, particularly in Europe, is not limited to terror, which is not even the most effective instrument of the many available to promote the spread of Islam. Tell us again why the $450 billion -- climbing inexorably -- that has been spent or committed for expendure to date in Iraq and Afghanistan, would not have been better spent, in combatting the Jihad, if it had all been put into energy projects (solar, wind, nuclear, hydrogen, ethanol, whatever you can possibly think of) and mass transit, and energy conservation measures. Would that $450 billion not have stopped the flow of vast sums to the Arab and Muslim states who make up almost the entire membership of OPEC? And would not that put an end to the use of the "wealth" weapon that is the main instrument, along with demographic conquest and Da'wa within Infidel lands, of the Jihad?

Tell us why you cannot figure out a way to exploit, instead of shying away from -- possibly for fear of being blamed for creating (which is nonsense, and easily shown to be nonsense) the deep divisions, ethnic and sectarian, that long predate the arrival of the Americans, the appearance of Saddam Hussein, and Ba'athism, and the existence of modern Iraq, and go back to the earliest days of Islam, when the Sunni-Shi'a split began, and the Arab supremacism at the core of a pretend-universalist message was initially fashioned, and made permanent.

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Be specific. Answer every question raised.